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modulation of siesta behavior could be
surveyed in additional Drosophila popula-
tions and species to more precisely
determine its degree of conservation.
Intriguingly, in the distantly related fungus
Neurospora crassa the central clock gene
frequency undergoes temperature-
dependent splicing to ensure a stable
period length across a range of tempera-
tures, suggesting that circadian clock
circuits may have preferentially incorpo-
rated temperature-sensitive splicing
mechanisms (Diernfellner et al., 2007).
In a broader context, the experiments
presented in the paper point to multiple
mechanisms besides dmpi8 splicing that
seasonally modulate daily activity in
Drosophila. First, photoperiod modulates
the onset of evening activity in the
absence of conditional per splicing at
the last intron in D. yakuba. Second,
temperature modulates siesta time in
transgenic D. melanogaster lacking
a temperature-sensitive dmpi8. While the
explanation for the former observation
likely involves clock-dependent synchro-
nization of the evening activity peak
relative to dusk, a combination of clock-
dependent and clock-independent be-
havioral responses to temperature may
help explain the latter observation.
Regardless, it is clear that we can expect
new discoveries concerning the molec-
ular basis of seasonal behavior to keep
appearing for quite some time.
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Is decision making in the brain (a) optimal, (b) stochastic, (c) probabilistic, or (d) all of the above? Two papers
in this issue of Neuron by Beck et al. and Furman and Wang address these questions by constructing model
neural circuits capable of picking one option given multiple perceptual choices.The neurobiological basis of decision-
making has been intensely studied by
systems neuroscientists over the last few
decades. Much of this work has been
based on paradigms in which, in each trial,
a subject selects one of two possible
choices. In parallel with the experimental
work, a variety of theories and models
have been proposed, and what stands
out is that even highly simplified phenom-
enological models have been able to
capture much of the psychophysical and
neurobiological data in the two-alternative
tasks (Smith and Ratcliff, 2004). Recently,946 Neuron 60, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Ehowever, Mike Shadlen’s group added
an important piece to this puzzle with
aneurophysiological studythathadanovel
feature: it used a task with four alternatives
(Churchland et al., 2008). These new
experimental results, which on the surface
seem deceptively similar to those obtained
with two-alternative tasks, strongly disam-
biguate and constrain the models, and
as a consequence, this issue of Neuron
delivers something rather unprecedented
in neuroscience: back-to-back theoretical
papers addressing the same experimental
data but starting from entirely differentlsevier Inc.approaches (Beck et al., 2008; Furman
and Wang, 2008). Both studies describe
neural circuits that replicate psychophys-
ical and neurophysiological results ob-
tained during choice behaviors. However,
Xiao-Jing Wang’s group aimed to capture
as much biophysical detail as possible,
whereas Alex Pouget’s group aimed to
implement key mathematical principles
that neural circuits should employ if they
are to generate optimal choices.
One of the most popular paradigms for
studying the neural basis of decision-
making is a two-alternative forced-choice
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Previewstask in which a group of dots moving in
random directions is displayed and the
subject must decide whether the overall
motion is to the left or to the right (or any
opposite directions). The choice is indi-
cated with an eye movement either to
a left or to a right target. The difficulty of
the task is controlled by the coherence
parameter, which is the proportion of
dots that move in the same direction, left
or right. Psychophysical performance in
this task is summarized by plotting two
quantities, the percentage of correct
choices and the subject’s reaction time,
as functions of coherence.
A lot is known about the neurophysio-
logical underpinning of this task, which
includes three key processing stages.
First, neurons in cortical area MT respond
to the random-dot stimuli and are thought
to mediate the perceptual experience of
visual motion (Salzman et al., 1992; Brit-
ten et al., 1993). Each MT neuron fires
preferentially in response to motion in
one particular direction.
Second, motion information encoded
by the MT responses is then relayed to
other cortical areas involved in the gener-
ation of motor commands for moving the
eyes, such as area LIP. The perceptual
decision is at least partially created at
this point, because the activity of LIP
neurons reflects the progressive accumu-
lation of sensory evidence in favor of one
or the other motor alternative (Shadlen
and Newsome, 2001; Hanks et al., 2006).
Think of two LIP cells with the left and right
targets covering their receptive fields.
When the subject starts viewing the
random-dot display, the firing rates of
both neurons are low. Then, as it becomes
clear that the dots move, say, preferen-
tially to the left, the activity of the neuron
with the left target in its receptive field
starts ramping up, and when it reaches
a certain threshold level, an eye movement
to the left target is triggered. This ramping
activity is neither decidedly sensory nor
decidedly motor. On one hand, it is tightly
correlated with the subject’s motor
choice. For instance, at zero coherence
the subject essentially picks one of the
targets at random, and the chosen target
is reliably signaled by the LIP firing rates.
On the other hand, the slope of the climb-
ing activity increases with coherence, so it
is strongly modulated by the strength and
direction of motion.Third, LIP and other cortical areas
project to downstream motor centers,
such as the superior colliculus, which
are thought to select one motor action
unambiguously (McPeek and Keller,
2004; Lo and Wang, 2006). Activation of
these higher-level motor areas, together
with initiation of the eye movement,
occurs once the accumulated sensory
evidence reaches a certain threshold level
(Hanes and Schall, 1996; Shadlen and
Newsome, 2001; Lo and Wang, 2006).
The two new modeling studies in this
issue of Neuron simulate the formation of
a decision during the random-dot motion
discrimination task in a circuit of intercon-
nected LIP neurons. These models repli-
cate the single-neuron activity recorded in
monkeys, as well as the animals’ perfor-
mance and reaction-time curves as func-
tions of coherence, in two- and multiple-
alternative tasks. It may sound as if the
two model circuits are very similar, and
indeed, the networks have similar connec-
tivity footprints and similar input and
output representations—but they spring
from extremely different mathematical
approaches.
The model by Furman and Wang (2008)
is closely related to ‘‘attractor networks,’’
circuits that, due to strong recurrent inter-
actions, are capable of generating multiple
stable patterns of activity in the absence of
specific inputs (Wang, 2001). Attractor net-
works have been traditionally used as
models for memory because they produce
self-sustained responses; however, only
a subsetof the neurons can behighlyactive
at any given time, and it is this internal
competition which makes them useful for
decision making. In contrast, the model
by Beck and colleagues (2008) is grounded
on ‘‘Bayesian inference,’’ which is the
mathematics used for calculating the
probability that a hypothesis is true.
Bayesian inference is fundamental for
many branches of science. In neurosci-
ence, it is used to understand both the
variability of neurons—their spontaneous
fluctuations in activity—and how they
represent uncertainty in the world (Pouget
et al., 2003; Ma et al., 2006).
Furman and Wang (2008) took the
bottom-up route. They constructed a
network with roughly 2000 excitatory and
500 inhibitory neurons connected all-to-
all, and included as much biophysical
detail as possible given those numbers.Neuron 60,The neurons in their network produce
spikes and interact witheach other through
realistic synaptic conductances. This one
is the descendent of an earlier model by
Wang (2002) that had a much simpler
architecture and which provided several
key insights about the dynamics of spiking
networks. In particular, it showed that
a competition between two alternatives
can be reproduced accurately by two pop-
ulations of neurons that inhibit each other
reciprocally but that contain excitatory
recurrent interactions within each popula-
tion. This organization creates a ‘‘slow
reverberation’’ whereby the activity of one
population progressively ramps up and
dominates over the other, as observed in
real data. In addition, this kind of model
produces simulated spike trains with high
variability, close to the variability observed
in recorded cortical neurons. High vari-
ability is fundamental, because it allows
a network to behave stochastically in the
face of ambiguous or insufficient evidence:
in trials with zero coherence, when the dots
move inall directions, the modelessentially
flips a coin; it chooses one of the two
options randomly, just like subjects do.
The new model by Furman and Wang
(2008) generalizes these principles to the
case of a larger circuit in which many pop-
ulations compete with each other in
a continuous way. Thus, the model is cap-
able of slow reverberation and stochastic
behavior but even when there are many
possible choices. This is how it works
(see Figure 1). The receptive fields of the
model LIP neurons are spatially arranged
along a circle around the fixation point.
The choice targets are located on that
same circle. The model neurons are
driven by a background input, by an input
that corresponds to the presence of
a choice target inside the receptive field,
and by simulated MT spikes. The neuron
at, say, the 12 o’clock position receives
input from MT neurons that prefer vertical
motion, the neuron at the 6 o’clock posi-
tion receives input from MT neurons that
prefer downward motion, and so on.
When the random dots are turned on in
the simulation, the LIP units at the target
positions slowly integrate their inputs until
one of them dominates and suppresses
the rest, due to the mutual inhibition
across the circuit.
Beck and colleagues (2008), on the
otherhand,alsoconstructedacompetitiveDecember 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 947
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however, is more abstract because
the firingof each neuron isdetermined
through an analog quantity that repre-
sents firing rate, or spiking probability.
This is important, because it lets the
authors control what the network is
actually computing. How did Beck
et al. (2008) generate this model?
They took a decidedly top-down
approach. Starting with Bayesian
principles, they derived a number of
conditions that a neural circuit should
satisfy if it is to make optimal choices;
optimal in the sense that the sensory
information on which the choice is
based is accumulated over time as
efficiently as possible. Key to obtain-
ing these conditions was an earlier
study (Ma et al., 2006) showing that
the variability of cortical neurons is of
a special type, a type that drastically
simplifies the representation of prob-
abilities and their combinations
through neural activity. As a conse-
quence of that result, it turns out that
the optimal computational strategy
for LIP could not be simpler: each
LIP unit should add over time the input
that it receives from MT. What is
surprising is that, according to the
theory, such integration should be
the same regardless of the task, the
number of targets, the correlations in the
input signals, and even if the parameters
of the sensory signal (e.g., contrast or
coherence) change during the course of
a trial.
This gives rise to an interesting predic-
tion: if the coherence of the display
changes in the middle of a trial, the slopes
of the ramping responses should change
accordingly, regardless of how much
has been accumulated so far. Furman
and Wang (2008) did not simulate this
situation, and it will be important to see
if their model—and real LIP neurons—
show this effect. Similarly, their results
predict that a particular pattern of errors
should be seen when the choice targets
are relatively close to each other, and it
will be interesting to see if this also
happens in reality and in the model of
Beck and colleagues (2008).
What, then, are the key differences
between the two LIP models? Which is
better? I think these are the wrong ques-
tions. The biophysical model has many
degrees of freedom that can be tweaked,
and even more details can be added to
it, so in a way its predictive power is limited
by the very same level of detail that makes
it convincing. On the other hand, the prob-
abilistic model establishes a set of compu-
tational operations, rather than a specific
circuit, so it requires some kind of transla-
tion into a biophysical substrate, which,
again, is less constrained.
In my view, these models represent
highly complementary approaches, and
a better question is simply how to chal-
lenge and exploit them so that we learn
something new about decision making.
For example, according to the probabi-
listic model, the LIP responses should
reflect not only the choice made but also
its certainty, the probability that the deci-
sion is correct. This feature may be
amenable to experimental verification
through novel variants of the random-dot
task. For instance, normally, certainty
goes hand-in-hand with coherence—
but this dependency can be disrupted.
Suppose that there are four targets
and the motion is clearly to the left;
suddenly, the left target disappears
and the subject has to choose one
of the remaining targets. In this
case, the LIP activity should encode
the choice, as usual, but the subject
will be quite certain that it was wrong.
This certainty should have an impact
on the LIP responses.
If such an effect is indeed found
experimentally, then the next ques-
tion will be, what biophysical mecha-
nisms account for it? Turn, then, to
Furman and Wang’s level of descrip-
tion. Their model may reproduce the
effect with little or no additional modi-
fication. Alternatively, to replicate the
impact of certainty it might be neces-
sary to simulate, for example, addi-
tional voltage-sensitive currents on
the cell membranes, or the action of
specific neuromodulators. In any
case, with this tool it should be
possible to identify at least candidate
electrochemical mechanisms.
The broader point is that, ideally,
there should be a back-and-forth
dialog, not only between experimen-
talists and theoreticians, but also
between the two levels of description,
whereby the high-level model tells us
what the circuit is computing and the
low-level one tells us how. This type of
synergy is much more likely to advance
our understanding of decision making,
and of neural function in general, than
a single modeling framework alone, or no
framework at all.
For now, we can say that decision
making is based on stochastic neural
dynamics and that, at least under certain
conditions, it is optimal according to the
principles of Bayesian inference. There-
fore, regarding the question posed at the
beginning of this preview, the evidence
gathered so far indicates that the correct
choice is (d), all of the above.
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